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THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM OF PENNSYLVANIA
In a recent address at Dickinson Law School, the Honorable Swirles L.
Himes, a juvenile court judge, remarked: "When I sit in a court of law, I
wear a black hat; when I sit in a court of equity, I wear a white hat; when I
sit in the juvenile court, I wear a red hat." 1 These words are appropriate in
describing the feeling of those judges who sit in the juvenile court because
the responsibility is great and the danger of an improvident decision is not
to be taken lightly.
The purpose of this article is to describe the juvenile court law of Pennsylvania as it functions today. Consideration will be given to the court's functions and procedures, with specific emphasis on questions of jurisdiction, adjudication, and constitutionality.
The Act of 19332 is the basis of contemporary juvenile court law. In the
preamble to this act the General Assembly clearly established the purpose and
intent of the law as follows:
[T]hat children should be guarded from association and contact with
crime and criminals, and the ordinary process of the criminal law does not provide for such care, guidance and control as are essential to children in the
formative period of life; and
Experience has shown that children, lacking proper parental care or
guardianship, are led into courses of life which may render them liable to the
penalties of the criminal law, and that the real interests of such children re-

quire that they be not incarcerated in jails and penitentiaries, as members of
the criminal class, but be subjected to wise care, guidance and control so that
evil tendencies may be checked and better instincts be strengthened; and

Whereas, to these ends, it is important that the powers of the courts with
respect to the care, guidance and control over delinquents, neglected, and dependent children should be clearly distinguished from those exercised in the
ordinary administration of the criminal law; .. 3
Juvenile court decisions have been influenced by this passage. This is
illustrated in Commonwealth v. Lash' where an adult was being tried before
a juvenile court for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In interpreting
a point of law concerning the juvenile court's jurisdiction over adults, the court
1 Statement
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discussed legislative intent and the expressed purpose of juvenile court law.
The court stated:
This new step [juvenile court jurisdiction over adults] was motivated by
the desire, (1) to eliminate trial by jury wherever possible, perhaps on the
theory that judges are more competent than juries to pass on the credibility
of immature witnesses, and (2) wherever practicable, to afford child-witnesses in
cases involving adults, as well as children proceeded against, the benevolent
environment of the juvenile court, to protect them from the harmful effect of
appearing, in any capacity, in the criminal court. 5
Clearly, then, the purpose of the juvenile court appears to be the protection of children and the curtailment of criminal tendencies in their incipiency.
However, it is designed and intended for the aid of dependent and neglected
as well as delinquent children.
For one to attempt to define with any degree of certainty a delinquent,
neglected or dependent child would be futile. These words describe a course
of conduct, a state of facts which give rise to adverse conditions, or even a
state of mind evidenced by the child's acts. This problem gives rise to an
appearance of inconsistency in adjudications throughout the state. However,
it must be remembered that each case has its own circumstances and factors
extraneous to whatever may be the criteria of the statutes. Each judge in the
state may consider a stated course of conduct differently. This may depend upon
the area (urban or rural) as well as the differences inherent in human beings.
In a given court its jurisdiction is the primary question. By statute the
juvenile court has full and exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings affecting
delinquent, neglected and dependent children.6 As we have seen, these terms
cannot be exactly defined, but the legislature has prescribed certain limits
as guides for this determination.
The following statutory definition of a delinquent child is sufficiently general to include most types of misconduct.
The words "delinquent child" include: (a) a child who has violated any
law of the Commonwealth or ordinance of any city, . . . ; (b) a child who, by
reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient, is uncontrolled .. .; (c) a
child who is habitually truant from school or home; (d) a child who habitually
so deports himself or herself as to injure or endanger the morals or health of
himself, herself, or others.7
5Id. at 603, 30 A.2d at 610 (1943).
6 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 244 (1953).
7 PA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 11,

§ 243 (1939).
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In considering this issue the courts have given this provision a reasonable interpretation. In Commonwealth v. Straik Judge Woodside defined the term
delinquency: "Delinquency is a very broad term involving in some cases a single
act and in others a course of conduct, sometimes with no single act sufficiently
serious to warrant a finding of delinquency." ' Thus defined, the term "delinquent" appears to emanate from the child's conduct and temperament; and
if, at the hearing in the juvenile court, the judge finds that the child displays
attitudes or animosities indicative of one who needs guidance, the judge may
properly adjudicate the child a delinquent.
Juvenile court judges have been given great discretionary power at the
hearings by statute and court decisions. This discretion, however, is limited by
reason and fair play, by the court's inclination to give juveniles the benefit of
the doubt, and by the court's desire to help the child.
The statutory definition of a "neglected child" is as general as that of
"delinquent child." Hence, the court also has expansive discretionary powers
in this area.'"
When deciding whether a child is neglected, the following statutory
criteria must be considered:
The words "neglected child" include: (a) a child who is abandoned by
his or her parent, guardian, custodian, or legal representative; (b) a child who
lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his or her parent,
; (c) a child whose parent, . . . neglects or refuses to provide proper
or necessary subsistence, education, medical or surgical care, or other care necessary for his or her health, morals, or well-being; (d) a child whose parent,
...neglects or refuses to provide the special care made necessary by his or her
mental condition; (e) a child who is found in a disreputable place, or associates
with vagrant, vicious, or immoral persons; (f) a child who engages in an occupation, or in a situation, dangerous to life or limb, or injurious to the health
or morals of himself, herself, or others."

When determining neglect, the state is generally the claiming party and
the parent or person having custody of the child is the responding party. Duties
of the court include a finding of the facts and a determination of whether
these facts warrant an adjudication of neglect due to the acts and conduct of
the parents and the subsequent effect of the parent's acts on the child. The
question is: do these circumstances have an adverse effect on the child? 12 In
8 175 Pa. Super. 10, 102 A.2d 239 (1954).
RId. at 15, 102 A.2d at 241 (1954).
10 Rose Child Dependency Case, 161 Pa. Super. 204, 54 A.2d 297 (1947).

1PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243 (1939).

12 In re Rinker, 180 Pa. Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955).
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neglect and dependency proceedings the court keeps its customary caution with
due respect for a child's need for his or her parents, and, therefore, the juvenile
court hesitates to take a child from its family.
Another possible adjudication which may be made by the juvenile court
is whether a child is "dependent." The Act of 1933 provides: "The words dependent child include: (a) a child who is homeless or destitute, or without
proper support or care, through no fault of his or her parents, . . . ; (b) a child
who lacks proper care by reason of the mental or physical condition of the
parent, . . . "3 Dependency proceedings may be instituted by any interested
party and here, as in neglect and delinquency proceedings, the state is both
arbiter and a party to the action.
Regardless of whether the juvenile court is determining a child delinquent,
neglected or dependent, it has the sole power to determine the issues. The court
may be reversed on appeal only when there has been an abuse of discretion. 4
A hearing in the juvenile court need only give rise to evidence which can adequately substantiate the adjudication. These procedures of the juvenile court
conform to the tenor of the Act of 1933 and subsequent amendments which
are designed to prevent inimical conditions in children.
As provided by statute, any citizen has the right to initiate proceedings in
the juvenile court.
The powers of the court may be exercised .. .(1) Upon the petition of
any citizen, resident of the country, setting forth that....
(2)

Upon commitment, by any magistrate, alderman or justice of the

peace, of a child arrested for any indictable offense, other than murder, or for

the violation of any other laws of this Commonwealth or the ordinance of any
city, borough or township.
(3) There shall be no preliminary hearings .. .affecting dependents, de-

linquent, or neglected children under the age of sixteen (eighteen) years. 15

Due to this statute, many cases are brought before the court for determination that have not been discovered by a court officer. Since welfare and social
workers are frequently confronted with situations which should be remedied
by the court, they often initiate these proceedings. Proceedings may also be
initiated when a child is arrested by the police and appears before a judge,
alderman, justice of the peace or magistrate.
§ 243 (1939).
14 Weintraub Appeal, 166 Pa. Super. 342, 71 A.2d 823 (1950).
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 246 (1939).
13 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
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In all cases where a child is appearing before the juvenile court, a petition
must be filed to commence the proceedings. In addition to the requirement
of a hearing, adequate notice of the hearing must be afforded the parents or
legal representatives of the child so they may have an opportunity to be heard
and participate in the proceedings.16 Failure to comply with these prerequisites renders the hearing void.17
In juvenile court proceedings there is no preliminary hearing. However,
the judge may issue such preliminary orders as he believes necessary to assure
the child's appearance at the hearing or to relieve an urgent situation requiring
immediate precautionary action. If this order is deemed necessary, the court
may detain a child under sixteen in a home for juveniles, in the custody of persons other than his parents, or in some other designated place, provided .the
place is not one which is used for the detention of criminals. When the child
is sixteen years of age or over the court may detain him in a criminal institution.
Preliminary orders given by the court vary according to the fact situations
involved. Among the facts to be considered are the child's past juvenile record,
if available, the crime committed, if any, the child's temperament, the child's
home, and his family. A preliminary order detaining a child is not a drastic
measure because a hearing usually follows shortly thereafter, and a child is
detained only under circumstances which do not deny the propriety of that
course of action.
Hearings in the juvenile court are conducted as informally as possible in
order to allow the court a greater flexibility in receiving and hearing evidence.
Courts generally do not keep a record of the hearing because of practical considerations. However, the child can demand one as a matter of right. To this
end the rules of evidence and procedure followed in the administration of the
criminal law are not strictly adhered to in the juvenile court. When determining admissible evidence it is necessary to examine the case law in an attempt to
ascertain some principles which would be applicable in a given case.
A distinction should be drawn between evidence which is admissible when
determining whether a child is delinquent, dependent or neglected, and evidence which is considered when the court decides what remedial steps are
needed to properly guide the child. The former shall be referred to as adjudication; the latter shall be referred to as disposition.
In the adjudication of a case certain facts and statements made by the
child or others may be admitted into evidence which might not be admissible in
18 Ibid; In re Rose, 161 Pa. Super. 204, 54 A.2d 297 (1947);
137, 103 A.2d 454 (1954).
17 In re Rose, 161 Pa. Super. 204, 54 A.2d 297 (1947).

in re Holmes, 175 Pa. Super.
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a criminal action.' 8 In In re Rinker,"9 for purposes of adjudication, the court
allowed testimony by neighbors and others as to the child's statements in conversation and, at the same time, the court rejected testimony by a welfare
worker who related stories and gossip of the neighbors. The latter was strictly
hearsay and the court held that it was not a proper consideration in making
an adjudication.
If a child is adjudicated delinquent, dependent, or neglected, the question
then becomes: what disposition shall be made? The court should consider all
relevant facts which reveal the child's feelings. Is he happy? Does he have
any animosities toward individuals? Does his environment tend to breed evil
or criminal tendencies? When determining these factors the court may consider any available source of information," such as reports on the child by
probation officers, psychiatrists, or any interviewing officer of the court. In
this same capacity, the court may properly consider the child's past juvenile
record, and his age, mental and physical capacities, impediments, religious
beliefs, and personality. These factors have a bearing on the disposition to
be made of the case in determining whether to place the child on probation,
in a foster home or perhaps in a State Industrial School.
Some of the considerations made in the disposition of a case may not be
used as a basis for an adjudication." Reports by interviewing officers should
normally have no relevance for adjudication purposes and, therefore, they are
usually inadmissible. However, a mental condition may be the basis of an
adjudication of neglect, in which case the officer's report might be admissible.
If the court finds the child to be delinquent, dependent, or neglected it
may dispose of the case in a variety of ways.
The Act of 1939 provides:
At the hearing, or any continuation thereof, the judge or judges shall make
an inquiry of the facts, and determine whether the best interests and welfare of
the child (and the State) require the care, guidance and control of such child,
and shall make an order accordingly.
The court may:
(a) Allow the child to remain in its home under the care of his or her
parents, or place such child in a suitable family home, subject, in either case
to the supervision and guardianship of a probation officer ....
18

In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1955).
19 180 Pa. Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955).
20 In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1955).
21

Ibid.

and may re-

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64

quire such child to be returned to the court for further proceedings whenever
the same appears to the court to be necessary.

(b) Commit a child to the care, guidance and control of some reputable
citizen of good moral character, subject to the supervision of a probation officer ...
(c) Commit a child to some suitable institution or to the care of . . . society . . . , one whose objects is the care, guidance and control of . . . children. ....

(d) Commit a child to an industrial or training school . .
and control.

. ,

for care, guidance

(e) Commit any child over the age of sixteen years to any state industrial
trial school ...
No child shall be committed . . . by any magistrate, alderman or justice
of the peace, .. 22

These provisions are necessary because disposition is a matter of judging
individual situations; therefore, special consideration of each child and his
interests is the matter of primary concern to the court.
Probation is one of the most common dispositions for delinquent children. Dependent and neglected children are usually placed in foster homes
or institutions when it is deemed necessary to take them from their parents.
When a child is placed on probation, certain rules and terms of probation are emphasized in an attempt to impress upon the child the seriousness
of his delinquency.23 Proper terms of probation are those which, if adhered
to, aid the child in extinguishing his delinquent tendencies.
An example of improper terms of probation appear in In re Trignani 24
and the Weiner Appeal. 5 In these cases the court ordered the juveniles to
make restitution for their wrongs. Upon appeal the superior court emphasized
that a juvenile court was not a civil court and held that restitution was a civil
matter not in keeping with the purpose of the juvenile court law. The purpose
of probation is not to make good the damages flowing from a child's illegal
act, but it is to benefit and reform the child. It may appear that forcing the
child to make restitution would be effective in impressing the child with the
seriousness of his acts; however, as a practical matter, in most instances neither
the child nor his family can afford to make restitution.
§ 250 (1939).
Weiner Appeal, 176 Pa. Super. 255, 106 A.2d 915 (1954).
24 150 Pa. Super. 491, 28 A.2d 702 (1942).
22 176 Pa. Super. 255, 106 A.2d 915 (1954).
22 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
23

NOTES
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For purposes of observing the child's progress and conduct, and to insure
the court that the child is complying with the terms of his probation, he must
periodically report to a court assigned probation officer. If the juvenile court
subsequently learns that a child has broken the terms of his probation, the
court shall entertain further proceedings and the probation may be revoked.
Juvenile court law does not deprive the courts of quarter sessions and
oyer and terminer of jurisdiction to try a delinquent child of sixteen years or
over for an indictable offense.2" However, the indictment and prosecution by
these courts rests in the discretion of the juvenile court.2 7 In In re Trignani28
the juvenile court ordered that the child be sent to the State Industrial School
at White Hill, and the juvenile court also held him for bond for the grand
jury on a charge of assault and battery by automobile. On appeal the superior
court struck out the last part of the order. It was pointed out that exclusive
jurisdiction over children under sixteen years of age has been given to the juvenile court. It was also for that court to determine after a hearing whether the
best interests of the child and the state required its care, guidance, and control. In such cases the juvenile court could retain jurisdiction, or decide that
a prosecution of such case on an indictment would be a more just disposition.
If it is decided that the child should be prosecuted, the judge then certifies
the same to the district attorney who proceeds in the same manner as though
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court had never attached. This situation illustrates the flexibility of the juvenile court and the manner in which it retains
or relieves itself of jurisdiction.
Once the juvenile court' exercises its jurisdiction the other courts lose their
jurisdiction, and the juvenile division shall decide what is best for the child
and the state. This last course of action may be a prosecution under the
criminal law.
Throughout the pertinent statutes relating to the juvenile court law
one phrase frequently appears: ". . . other than murder...." What are the
consequences and procedures when a child commits murder? Although it
does not appear in the statutes, the juvenile court still has jurisdiction over a
child who effected the death of another and could be indicted for murder.29
This question rests in the discretion of the juvenile court and involves the
28

1n re Trignani, 150 Pa. Super. 491, 28 A.2d 702 (1942).
The prevailing practice in adult courts is to certify a child under eighteen years of age to the
juvenile court, but such procedure is only mandatory where the child -is under sixteen years of age.
28 150 Pa. Super. 491, 28 A.2d 702 (1943).
29 Such a case occurred June 1959 where a fifteen year old Philadelphia boy effected the death
of a three year old girl in an attempted rape. A court psychiatrist found the boy to be sane. There
was no indictment in the case, and the boy was adjudicated delinquent and placed in an Industrial
School. Also, see In re Edwards, 54 Pa. D. & C. 601 (1946).
27
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same procedures set forth above in regard to the juvenile court retaining
jurisdiction over a child.
Provision has been made by the juvenile court law for a reconsideration
of the disposition made in a case when the circumstances have been altered.
The Act of 1933 provides:
All orders made by the several juvenile courts with respect to delinquent,
dependent and neglected children shall up to the time a child attains the age
of twenty-one years, be subject to amendment, change and extension, by the
judges thereof, upon motion of the district attorney, or a probation officer,
or upon petition of any other person of interest , . .. 3
Significantly, the court has the power to reconsider the disposition made in
any given case and make any changes which it deems necessary.
In In re Redding "1the court recognized that the probation is a continuing
measure imposed by the court. In this case the child, after being frequently
warned for his misbehavior, had his probation revoked and was placed in an
institution. It was pointed out by the court that probation did not have a
deterrent effect on the child's misconduct. Such action by the courts is sanctioned where prior orders have not remedied the child's derelictions.
In other instances the courts have been cognizant of changed conditions
or circumstances which necessitated or made desirable an amendment in disposition. In Weintraub Appeal 32 an order committing a child to an institution for psychiatric treatment was not held final. In explanation, the court
said that a modification or even a revocation of the order could be effected by
petition. Reference was made to the fact that the child was still a ward of
the court subject to its control until he became 21 years of age, even when he
was allowed to remain in his own home.
A change in circumstances is a broad term which does not necessarily
limit itself to the child but includes all factors which affect him and the disposition."3 These cases also illustrate that the court should consider events
which have occurred since disposition was ordered, such as an arrest, a change
of a person's attitude, or economic conditions.
To justify a readjudication, errors of fact or law must be shown. An
appeal may be taken to the superior court. The Act of 1933 provides:
Within twenty-one days of the final order of any judge of the juvenile
court, . . . such child shall, as a matter of right .... have the right to present
:0

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 254 (1933).

81 184 Pa. Super. 352, 134 A.2d 689 (1957).
32 166 Pa. Super. 342, 71 A.2d 823 (1950).
asin re Salemno, 369 Pa. 278, 85 A.2d 406 (1951).
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to the court a petition to have his or her case or cases reviewed and reheard,
if ... . an error of fact or of law, or both, has been made in such proceedings
or final order, or if the said order has been improvidently or inadvertently made.
[Alppeals shall lie as a matter of right to the superior court, .

..

3,

This is a party's only remedy when he feels an injustice has occurred.

Habeas corpus proceedings are not a substitute or even a complement to the
statutory appeal procedure."
The words, "[IJf the said order has been improvidently or inadvertently
made," have been the basis of such appeals as Weintraub Appeal." This allowed the child, after an adjudication and disposition by the juvenile court,
to petition for a rehearing in order to present evidence that had not been heard.
In that case the evidence was given by a new witness and the court granted a
rehearing.

Additional testimony may be offered to prove a change of cir-

cumstances at the rehearing, the effect of which may or may not prompt the
juvenile court to change its decisionI 7 These changes could in substance
render the previous hearing in error due to a change in fact, but at the rehearing the court shall exercise its discretion exactly as it did in the first hearing. These appeals have taken the form of an error of fact through a change
in circumstances, or an abuse of discretion through some omission of evidence.
In these instances the appellate court may expressly reverse the juvenile court
in lieu of remanding the case for further findings.

A decision of the juvenile court could be reversed if there had been a
misapplication of the law, an exhibition of partiality, bias, or ill will.3 8 Such
grounds could be found by the appellate court from a review of the record
due to the fact that the proceedings must evidence a legally and factually
adequate basis to sustain the findings of the juvenile court and the result
reached. In reviewing the record the court shall consider all the evidence
presented in all hearings. This is proper because the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court is a continuing one which exists for the purpose of the child's care,
guidance and control during his formative years. Therefore, all events which
effect the child are relevant in the court's proceedings.
The Act of 1933 also provides that the juvenile court be the trier of fact
without the aid of a jury. If an adult appears before the juvenile court charged
34 PA. S'rAr. ANN. tit. 11, § 251 (1947).
s Commonwealth ex tel McQueen v. Prasse, 178 Pa. Super. 195, 112 A.2d 824 (1954).
38166 Pa. Super. 342, 71 A.2d 823 (1950).
aInreRinker, 180 Pa. Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1956).
38
In re Salemno, 169 Pa. Super. 240, 82 A.2d 560 (1951).
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with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, he may acquiese and allow
the juvenile court to entertain jurisdiction over him." Or he may demand a
trial by jury, in which event he shall be turned over to the district attorney
for a trial by jury before a court of quarter sessions or oyer and terminer.'0
Of course, when minors appear before the juvenile court, they are not
tried before a jury. This provision caused a great deal of controversy in the
court's incipiency. Criticisms have been made that such a procedure violates
constitutional rights since a child cannot have a trial by jury as a matter of right,
he does not have the benefits of due process of law, and in many cases he bears
witness against himself.
One of the earliest cases which discussed this point was Commonwealth
v. Fisher."1 In that case the Act of 1903 2 was being challenged because it
allowed the court to pronounce a child delinquent, neglected, incorrigible or
dependent without the benefit of a jury trial. Counsel for the child argued
that to deprive one of a jury trial in delinquency proceedings was unconstitutional. In holding the statute to be constitutional, the court said that it was
not dealing with a criminal, but with a child, and the purpose of the action was
not to punish but to help the child.
When the juvenile court law was substantially amended in 1933, the same
procedures were provided for with respect to the finding of fact. In the Mont
Appeal " the court held that a child, who has been adjudicated delinquent
under the law, rather than prosecuted for a criminal offense, has no inherent
constitutional or legal right to ask that the juvenile court proceedings be set
aside and that he be prosecuted in the criminal court. And in In re Holmes"
the Court said concerning delinquency proceedings:
[A] proceeding under such law [referring to the juvenile court) is not a
criminal case, but rather a procedure intended to save a child who violates the'
law from the ordeal of a criminal trial ....
The purpose underlying the law
is to avoid branding the child with the stigma of criminality and to insure the
growth of the child as a useful member of society. Therefore, many of the
constitutional guarantees granted to one formally charged with a criminal offense are not applicable to a proceeding under The Juvenile Court Law. 45
39

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §247 (1933).
40 Ibid.
41 213 Pa. 48, 62 At. 198 (1905).
42 P.L. 274 (1903).

"a175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954); also, see Commonwealth v. Carnes, 82 Pa. Super.
335 (1923).
4" 175 Pa. Super. 137, 103 A.2d 454 (1954), aff'd 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1955).
45 175 Pa. Super. at 143, 103 A.2d at 457.
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Children are to be treated as individuals who need care, guidance, and
control, which the state feels, as parens patriae, a duty to provide. It was to
this end that the juvenile court law was designed and is presently being applied.
Since juvenile court hearings are not criminal actions, certain safeguards
have been afforded to insure the child from any criminal association or disability. The Act of 1933 provides:
All sessions of the juvenile court shall be held separate from sessions of
the court held for the purpose of its general, criminal, and other business. The
records of the proceedings of the juvenile courts shall be kept in a docket seprate from all other proceedings of such courts, and shall be withheld from indiscriminate public inspection, but shall be open to inspection by the parent
or other representative of the person, institution, association
or society con4
cerned and other persons having a legitimate interest. 6
When this section of the statute refers to the "records," it means only what
transpires at the hearing and not reports of court officers. In In re Holmes"7
counsel for the child was not permitted access to the reports of court officers
but only to the official record of the hearing and proceedings of the court.
This does not violate any substantial rights of the child; in fact, this measure
exists for his protection. It is the intent of the statute that these proceedings
be kept private. A child is not required to reveal the fact that he has been
before the juvenile court or adjudicated delinquent, dependent, or neglected.
The Act of 1933 provides:
No order made by any juvenile court shall operate to impose any of the
civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by the criminal laws of the Commonwealth,
nor shall any child be deemed to be a criminal by reason of any such order or
be deeemed to have been convicted of crime. The disposition of a child or any
evidence given in a juvenile court shall not be admissible
as evidence against
48
the child in any case or proceeding in any other court.
A neglected, dependent or delinquent child is not a criminal. After appearing before the juvenile court or being committed to an institution, a child
should be able to re-enter society without the stigma of a criminal record. In
reality it is much more difficult for a convict to obtain employment than a
non-convict, and some positions specifically require that the applicant have no
criminal record. One who has appeared before the juvenile court, regardless
of disposition, could truthfully say that he had no criminal record and he had
never been imprisoned. This is necessarily so since it is the legislature's intent
to aid the juvenile and allow him every opportunity to become assimilated into
society without being handicapped in his endeavors.
GIRARD N. EVASHAVIK
48 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 269-403 (1939).
47 In re Holmes, supra note 44.
48 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 261 (1933).

